Foreshadowing Social Risk:The Dual Aspects of the Chemical Industry in Early Twentieth Century Japan by Yamabe Akinori
43
Foreshadowing Social Risk
I. Introduction
In recent years the discussion of “risk” in connection with science and 
technology policy have attracted much public attention. Indeed the progress of 
science and technology has helped to improve the convenience of the everyday 
life, but at the same time, if not managed properly, may be the cause of serious 
harm to human society. The radioactive contamination caused by the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear power plant following the disastrous East Japan Earthquake of 
March 11, 2011 is an obvious example. In addition to simple health hazards, 
the “accident” revealed the existence of critical (mis)communication problems 
between experts and non-professionals that hindered smooth and careful 
decision making. 
Studies on risk inherent in modern society are abundant with Beck’s 
Risk Society: Towards a New Modrnity, pioneer in the field. Recent research 
has been carried out from different perspectives, including research on the 
“uncertainty” of science and technology, and new approaches to the concept of 
“risk governance”.(1) According to Lundgren and McMakin, studies that focus 
on communication between stakeholders over issues of risk is another essential 
area.(2)  These points can be extended to the problems of general and social 
science and technology. For example, Mitcham applies the concept of risk to 
ethics and science and technology,(3) whereas Susanna sheds light on science, 
technology and communication.(4)
Nonetheless, while discussion on risk has been eagerly addressed in recent 
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years, little attention has been devoted to issues of historical background. In 
particular, there a paucity of research on risk in science, technology and society 
in historical perspective.
This article maintains that social dangers do not appear suddenly, but 
develop over time. In other words, risk has a history that may foreshadow 
potential harm in the future. An understanding of the history background of 
any problem will necessarily help to ward off its repetition. The human and 
environmental damage caused by Minamata disease is a good example. Methyl 
mercury contained in wastewater discharged without treatment by the Chisso 
Corporation from the 1950s was able to ender the body via the food chain. 
Then, neuropathy of the whole body was affected, leading to death in severe 
cases. Many cases of fetal Minamata disease caused by mercury entering the 
bloodstream through the placenta were also common. Government and non-
governmental group took action in the 1970s, but victims are still suffering and 
even today the problem not been fully solved. 
This article is an exercise in environmental history. In particular, it will 
examine the interaction between the development of the ammonium sulfate 
industry in Japan and its environmental consequences.(5) This article will trace 
the history of the chemical industry of Japan from late nineteenth century, the 
Meiji period when Japan began a process of rapid westernization, and, paying 
attention of issues of risk, follow the development of the chemical industry, with 
special focus on the transwar period of the 1930s to the 1950s, hoping thereby to 
find lessons applicable to the similar sorts of risks confronting Japanese society 
today.
II. Origins
1. Industrialization during the Meiji Period (1868-1912)
After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the Japanese government actively 
imported Western technology as a means to strengthen and enrich the country. 
The chemical industry, along with textiles and mining (iron, copper, and 
coal), was a key component in the quest to develop the country. The chemical 
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industry was of strategic importance, both because produced gunpowder and 
other explosives necessary for Japan’s modern army and navy and its success 
in war (the Sino-Japanese War 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War 1904-05), 
but perhaps more fundamentally because of a rapidly growing population and 
the very real possibility of famine. During times of peace and war, the health 
and strength of Japanese people depended on the production of food. Indeed, 
securing adequate supplies of food was as urgent a matter as improvements 
in armaments and industry. By the end of the Meiji period, the government 
encouraged the development of the chemical fertilizer industry as a means 
to insure enough nourishment for its growing population. The production of 
ammonium sulfate (ryūan) was especially important. It maintained a share of 
approximately 80 percent of the production of chemical fertilizers in Japan from 
until the end of World War II. Without ammonium sulfate the history of modern 
Japan would be completely different. This one chemical played a strategic role 
in improving the productivity of Japanese agriculture. 
2. Establishment of the Ammonium Sulfate Industry
The nineteenth century saw the birth of chemical industry all over the 
world. It developed through demand for chemical dyes in Germany and for 
chemical fibers in England. The Japanese chemical industry had its origin with 
the production of chemical fertilizers. In 1884, Takamine Jōkichi, an engineer 
attached to the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, brought back samples 
of superphosphate from the United States. He experimented and was able to 
produce a sort a coal-based fertilizer in cooperation with a superphosphate 
of lime manufacturing plant in Osaka. This was the beginning of the history 
of chemical fertilizer production in Japan.(6) Once its fertilizer effects were 
confirmed in 1888, the Tokyo Artificial Fertilizer Co., Ltd. was established, 
thereby focusing attention on the nascent chemical industry.(7) In 1896, Suzuka 
Mercantile, an agriculture supply outlet in Fukagawa, Tokyo, imported five 
tons of ammonium sulfate from a gas company of Australia. Other companies 
also embarked on the development of chemical fertilizers by using the import 
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ammonium sulfate. Ammonium sulfate began to be manufactured by Osaka Gas 
Company and Tokyo Gas Company in 1900, and the Yahata Ironworks in 1904. 
Other enterprises began to participate in ammonium sulfate production, and 
soon the product was in high demand with a high product value.(8)
In the early twentieth century, domestic production of ammonium sulfate 
was not able to meet demand, creating opportunities for new industrial ventures. 
In 1908, Noguchi Shitagau, the founder of Nihon Chisso Fertilizer Company, 
purchased coal nitrogen production (the so-called Frank-Caro process) patents 
from Germany, and quickly succeeded to modify ammonium sulfate from coal 
nitrogen.(9) In 1914, he opened a plant in Minamata (Kumamoto prefecture) to 
produce ammonia sulfate using a nitrogen-fixation process, and then in 1918 set 
up a new state-of-the-art factory in nearby Minamata, able to large volumes of 
ammonium sulfate at costs less than half of what was hitherto possible.(10) Under 
Nihon Chisso’s leadership, the ammonium sulfate industry in Japan became 
immensely profitable.(11) In 1921, Noguchi purchased patents for a new method 
to produce ammonia that had been developed in Italy by Dr. Luigi Casale.(12) In 
1923, Noguchi succeeded in applying the Casale method to factory production 
of ammonia at its Nobeoka plant in Miyazaki Prefecture, thereby establishing 
Chisso a world leader in the newly emerging but rapidly growing chemical 
fertilizer business. 
Initially the Japanese chemical industry depended upon the introduction of 
technology from overseas. In Chisso’s case, the acquisition of foreign patents 
proved decisive. Dai Nippon Artificial Fertlizer Company, founded in 1884, 
was another pioneer in the chemical fertilizer business, later becoming Nissan 
Chemical Industries.(13) The usual story of Japan’s industrial revolution in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century focuses on the transition of light industry 
(textiles) to heavy manufacturing (iron and steel and shipbuilding). The chemical 
industry deserves a special place in this narrative; indeed it was vital to Japan’s 
success in achieving wealth (fukoku) and power (kyōhei). Chemicals played an 
important role in increasing productivity of Japan’s soil thereby allowing Japan 
to feed a rapidly growing population; chemicals also gave the Japanese military 
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the means with which to secure and maintain a rapidly growing empire.  
III. Chemicals and Military Might
1. Expansion of State Control 
The Japanese government recognized the advantages of the use chemical 
fertilizers in obtaining high crop yields and included the production of ammonium 
sulfate as an important goal in agricultural policy. Problems arose in the 
1920s, however, when cheap imported ammonium sulfate flooded the market, 
threatening Japanese producers. In 1927, calling for a “rural development policy 
based on an equitable distribution of fertilizer,” the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry set up a Fertilizer Investigation Committee (Hiryō Chōsa I’inkai) 
composed of 6 members the Agriculture and Forestry Ministry, 4 from 
Commerce and Industry, 3 from domestic producers of chemical fertilizer, and 7 
other members, seeking to find a means for the equitable marketing of fertilizers 
in Japan.(14) The investigation committee drew up a Fertilizer Control bill for this 
purpose. It was presented to the 56th Diet in February 1929.(15) Debate ensued, 
seeing a compromise between industrial, agricultural, and the interests of the 
commercial fertilizer producers and retailers. There was much disagreement 
over the involvement of the government in fertilizer marketing and distribution. 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Farming was in favor of such intervention, 
while the Ministry of Commerce and Industry was opposed. Agreement among 
the three parties was reached in November and the bill passed a special Diet 
meeting in 1930, resulting in the establishment of a Fertilizer Section within the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the enactment of Fertilizer Distribution 
Improvement Regulations. Cooperatives were established that allowed domestic 
producers to directly to farmers, thereby circumventing distributors and causing 
prices to go down.(16) In this way, farmers could buy more fertilizer and increase 
their yield, resulting in more profit. Thus, at the outset of the Great Depression, 
thanks both the results of scientific research and to government intervention, 
ammonium sulfate increasingly entered into the daily lives of people. 
During the war years that began in the middle 1930s, Japan’s chemical 
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industry continued to produce ammonium sulfate, but less for chemical fertilizer. 
Instead, mobilized for war, most chemical factories were converted into the 
production of chemicals for munitions. The production of ammonium sulfate 
was transformed from peacetime to wartime uses, helping Japan to develop 
it military arsenal. The Japanese government enacted a Distribution Control 
and Ammonium Sulfate Production Law in April 1938 seeking to increase 
production by 40% in 1941.(17) The government set up the Nippon Ammonium 
Corporation in 1938 as one means to increase production. From August 1939, a 
distribution quota system of fertilizer was implemented, effectively placing the 
entire chemical industry under government (military) control.
On the one hand, the Japanese government spurred farmers to make 
intensive use of chemical fertilizer; indeed by the late 1930s, fully one-quarter 
to one-third of farm expenditures were devoted to the purchase of chemical 
fertilizer. On the other hand, ammonium sulfate and other chemicals were 
important for the production of munitions and Japan’s war effort. These controls 
paid off. In 1941, Japan’s chemical industries produced some 1,240,295 tons of 
ammonium sulfate, the peak of production since the birth of the industry.(18)  
2. Defeat 
The chemical industry collapsed after the outbreak of war with the United 
States on December 8, 1941. Production declined steadily. Bomb damage and 
disruption in transportation meant that the production of ammonia in 1944 was 
less than half of the 1941 output. By this time many factories were forced to 
stop production.(19) Compared with the prewar peak, the ability for substantial 
production of the chemical fertilizer at the end of the war had fallen drastically: 
to 10 percent of coal nitrogen, 71 percent of ammonium sulfate, and 21 percent 
of phosphoric acid coal.(20) Damage inflicted on ammonium sulfate industry due 
to bombing amounted to 91 percent for Showa Denko, (Kawasaki), 73 percent 
for Nihon Chisso (Minamata), 63 percent for Mitsubishi Kasei (Kurosaki), and 
59 percent for Asahikasei (Nobeoka).(21) Around these main facilities, 13 our to 
14 factories devoted to the production of ammonium sulfate received substantial 
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damage.(22) The damage rate inflicted on the entire chemical industry amounted 
to 54 percent. Naturally the production of artificial fertilizer decreased sharply. 
In August1945, the production of ammonium sulfate stood at 4 percent, coal 
nitrogen at 15 percent, and phosphoric acid coal at 1 percent, compared with 
the mean monthly production between 1935 and 1937.(23) The History of the 
Ammonium Sulfate Industry in Japan (Nihon ryūan kōgyō-shi), described the 
situation of the ammonium sulfate industry just after the war as follows:   
Everyone knew that the restoration of the artificial chemical industry was an 
urgent matter. Without exception, the people engaged in fertilizer industry 
began work to restore the industry from the day they heard the imperial 
edict that ended the war. In fact, however, there was little they could do. 
… Everything was connected with ammonium sulfate production was in 
short supply. Even one-tenth of the required amount of the steel and cement 
could not be obtained. Raw materials such as coke, coal, and pyrites were 
also unavailable. Gradually wartime mechanics and mobilized students 
returned home, but the work force remained insufficient as well. The life 
of the employees and their family members who stayed at the factory was 
miserable.(24) 
Furthermore, the loss of territories and colonies that made up the prewar 
empire, including Manchurian, Korea, Taiwan and Karafuto, was the cause 
of further difficulties in restarted the domestic chemical industry, as many 
Japanese firms had established ammonium sulfate factories overseas to help 
boost production. These factories were all destroyed or lost. For example, the 
prewar Korea Konan nitrogen fertilizer plant was one of the ten largest synthetic 
ammonia factories in the world. Its 500,000 ton per year production capacity was 
more than 26 percent of the 1,889,900 ton per year production capacity of all 
domestic production in 1943.(25) However, Japan lost all these factories at once 
in 1945. Table 1 summarizes the extent of damage suffered by major chemical 
companies specializing in the production of ammonium sulfate.
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Table 1.  Damage to Japan’s Ammonium Sulfate Plant by Air Raids(26)  
Company (location) Production 1944* Production 1945* Damage Rate (%)
Shōwa Denkō (Kawasaki) 330 300 91
Shin Nihon Chisso (Minamata) 75 55 73
Mitsubishi Kasei (Kurosaki) 80 50 63
Asahikasei (Nobeoka) 54 32 59
Tōagōsei (Nagoya) 110 60 55
Tōyō Kōatsu (ōwada) 200 100 50
Ubekōsan (Ube) 200 100 50
Beppu Kagau (Beppu) 50 25 50
Nittō Kagaku (Hachinohe) 50 25 50
Nittō Kagaku (Yokohama) 50 20 40
Nisshin Kagaku (Niihama) 240 60 25
*1000 tons
IV. Postwar Recovery
1. Hunger and the Reform of Japanese Society
Japan’s surrender on August 15, 1945 did not immediately lead to an end 
to hunger. Food shortages were already serious before aerial bombardments 
began in the summer of 1944. As the war continued, food production lagged, 
causing both physical hunger and mental fatigue. American bombing raids did 
not necessarily aim at disrupting the food supply; however, the destruction 
of Japan’s chemical factories that were linked to munitions, in effect reduced 
food production capacity by limiting the production of chemical fertilizers. 
Such multilayer damage combined with the aggravation of agrarian conditions 
accumulated from the war years necessarily contributed to severe food shortages 
following defeat. General McArthur and other occupation authorities known as 
SCAP (Supreme Command for Allied Powers) required the Japanese government 
to ameliorate the critical food shortage, but relief was slow to come.(27) People 
living in the city had to resort to black market buying and selling due to lack of 
basic foodstuffs.(28) Government actions proved ineffective, causing widespread 
feelings of exhaustion and depression among the Japanese people. 
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By late 1946, the Japanese government under the leadership of Prime 
Minister Yoshida Shigeru, committed itself to maximizing economic growth. 
It adopted a priority production system that focused on the coal and steel 
industries. However, well before Yoshida’s plan was announced, in a radio 
broadcast on August 21, 1945, the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Sengoku 
Kōtarō, announced: “Japan must restart as an agrarian country.”(29) The first step 
to rebuild Japan, according to Sengoku, was to improve the food situation and 
thereby stabilize society. Thereafter, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
focused on the revival of the ammonium sulfate industry was directly connected 
to an increase in food production. In this way, the revival of the ammonium 
sulfate industry was of key importance to national reconstruction. 
Due to the occupation, the Japanese government required permission from 
SCAP for all official actions related to reconstruction. The Japanese side drew 
up a basic policy regarding plans to restore the ammonium sulfate industry 
by the end of 1945. Japanese planners from the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry insisted on the re-conversion of munitions factories to ammonium 
sulfate plants of munitions factories. SCAP officials agreed, especially as the 
Japanese request was in line with occupation plans to thoroughly demilitarize 
Japan. On September 28, 1945, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry requested 
SCAP’s section on proceed with the conversion.(30) According to the Ministry’s 
priority production system (keisha seisan hōshiki), some two million tons of 
contents were required to stabilize the production of nitrogenous fertilizer.(31) 
Another 1,330,000 tons were to produced in a restored ammonium sulfate 
factory, 200,000 tons were to be produced in a plant converted from a synthetic 
oil factory into an ammonium sulfate factory, 90,000 tons from a converted 
methanol factory, and 380,000 tons were to be produced by coal nitrogen.(32) 
SCAP accepted the conversion of several military installations on October 1 
and gave orders to start rebuilding existing factories on October 10. Moreover, 
SCAP allowed for the conversion of three large-scale navy fuel depots in 
Yokkaichi, Nagoya, and Tokuyama into production facilities for ammonium 
sulfate. Furthermore, on the next day, October 11, Japanese government issued 
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“Emergency Measures to Ensure the Production of Fertilizer.”(33) In order to 
restore production of ammonium sulfate, the government announced plans to 
secure necessary funds, apparatus, materials, and raw materials. Later, on March 
2, 1946, another set of plans was announced by the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry: “Outline of Emergency Measures Regarding Chemical Fertilizer.”(34)
2. Ammonium Sulfate Industry Conference on Reconstruction 
A council of chemical fertilizer companies was formed in 1947 to 
discuss ways in the ammonium sulfate industry could contribute to Japan’s 
reconstruction. Known as the Ryūfuku (Amonium Sulfate for Reconstruction), 
the council, along with a similar coal industry council, was an important 
starting point for Japan’s economic recovery. The occupation initially sought to 
democratize and decentralize the whole of Japanese society, including industry. 
On October 26, 1946 the Japanese Trade Union Confederation proposed the 
establishment of a broad group of industrialists for recovery purposes.(35) Within 
the ammonium sulfate industry, the “National Industrial Ammonium Sulfate 
Federation of Trade Unions” (under the leadership of President Shoji Kan’ichi) 
began to discuss the idea of ammonium sulfate council to focus reconstruction 
initiatives. Later, on December 19 the Ammonium Sulfate Confederation 
officially set up a Ammonium Sulfate Fertilizer Manufacturers’ Association, 
which resulted, after another six months of discussion, in the establishment of 
the Ammonium Sulfate Reconstruction Council (Ryūfuku) on May 23, 1947. Its 
initial meeting was held on June 10 at the Ueno Seiyōken in Tokyo.(36)
Ryūfuku decided on a series of measures to increase production of 
ammonium sulfate. For example, in response to the national five-year 
reconstruction plan that was to begin in April 1948, Ryūfuku issued it own 
“New Policy to Increase Production” that aimed at an output of 2,700,000 tons 
of ammonia-based fertilizer ammonium.(37) As a result, significant increase 
in production were observed. By the end of 1949, a production capacity of 
1,860,000 tons of ammonium sulfate conversion had been reached.(38) By 
producing 1,707,000 tons of fertilizer and 190,000 tons of other ammonia-
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based produce, ammonium sulfate group of industries were nearly able to meet 
the production goal of 1,897,000 tons, the final goal of the five-year plan.(39) In 
addition, they set further goals to find ways to distribute this ammonium sulfate 
to consumers cheaply, and made efforts to bring down the cost of chemical 
fertilizers.(40) 
Three years had passed since the council was formed. During this period, 
manufacturing volume rose by 10 times, and controls on raw materials were also 
gradually relaxed. Moreover, various ammonium sulfate companies began to 
place priority on management strategy rather than simply increase in production. 
As a result of these developments, many agreed that the mission of Ryūfuku had 
been fulfilled. On April 21, 1950, the group of ammonium sulfate companies 
decided to disband the council and establishment a new organization.(41) The 
suggestion was approved and in June 1950 the Japan Ammonium Sulfate 
Industry Association took over a leadership role over the industry. The role 
played by Ryūfuku, however, was important. It had succeeded consolidating and 
rationalizing Japan’s domestic chemical industry, and in creating a diversified 
and democratic management style in company. It prepared the way for free 
competition between in fertilizer companies. And, of course, Ryūfuku helped to 
increased production of chemical fertilizers so important to helping to improve 
Japanese food output.
3. Success of Chemical Industry after the Second World War
After the war, the reconstruction of agriculture aimed at the rationalization 
of farm work. Alongside the introduction of new machines and new seeds, 
the chemical industry played an important role in helping to make Japanese 
soil more fertile. Although rice production stood only at 5,872 tons in 1945, it 
was doubled to 9,208 tons in 1946.(42) The production capacity of the land was 
restored and gradually continued to improve. The return of peace and farm 
workers helped of course, but at the same time there was a rapid increase of 
demand for chemical fertilizers that, as we have seen, the ammonium sulfate 
industry strove to meet. In 1945, the production volume of ammonium sulfate 
54
stood at 243,021 tons. It nearly doubled every year thereafter. And, in 1950, 
it reached 1,501,293 tons, far beyond the 1,240,295 tons which was the peak 
reached in the prewar period (in 1941).(43) Furthermore, around 1950 the 
ammonium sulfate industry began to stabilize and the production volume finally 
exceeded domestic demand. Gradually ammonium sulfate came to be counted 
as one of Japan’s “exports products.” The chemical industry, including the 
production of ammonium sulfate, was destined to play a part in the spectacular 
recovery of the Japanese economy after the Second World War. 
“The year 1950 is considered to be a turning point of ammonium sulfate 
industry because of exports.”(44) The year also represented the takeoff in the 
“postwar chemical industry.” It was a major growth industry; chemicals were 
used in many other areas beyond agriculture, namely in plastics, household 
appliances, automobiles, medicine, preservatives; indeed chemicals entered in 
nearly every aspect of daily life. Moreover, the postwar chemical industry began 
to have direct ramifications on lifestyles and the security of people as well as a 
beneficial effect on local economies. 
Table 2.  Production of Ammonium Sulfate, 1933 - 1953
 
V. Unexpected Social Changes: The Four Major Pollution Diseases
The development of chemical industry in Japan was an essential element 
in Japan’s rapid economic growth years, the late 1950s and throughout the 
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1960s. Japanese life became richer in substance, but chemical industry also 
had a negative effect on Japan’s environment and society. While the chemical 
industries succeeded in reducing production costs, and thereby lowering the 
price of chemical fertilizers, a number of serious environmental pollution 
problems arose. Chemical pollution was widespread, such as air pollution, water 
pollution and soil contamination. The waste from chemical plants polluted 
the river and the sea and destroyed whole ecosystems. The health of workers 
and people living near industrial chemical factories were severely affected; 
especially by the discharge of methyl mercury into the food chain.. The adverse 
effects of the Japanese chemical industry were revealed in the form of several 
now-infamous pollution diseases that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Ironic and tragic are the world to describe Japan’s postwar rapid economic 
growth. Japan’s chemical industry was responsible for four major pollution-
related illnesses as well as the pollution of the natural environment. In 1956, 
Minamata disease was discovered in Kumamoto Prefecture, a form of mercury 
poisoning caused by untreated industrial wastewater emitted from Nihon Chisso 
Company’s Minamata nitrogen fertilizer plants.(45) The scale of death and injury 
to health marks the Minimata disease has surely darkened the pages of human 
history. In 1965, a second outbreak of Minamata disease occurred in the Agano 
river basin in Niigata Prefecture. The pollution source was mercury contained 
in the wastewater from the acetaldehyde synthesis process of Showa Denko’s 
Kanose factory, tragically following along the same lines as the first Minamata 
disease ten years earlier.(46) Victims and their supporters sued Showa Denko in 
1967, the first industrial pollution trial in Japan, but not the last. Itai-Itai disease 
also resulted from industrial pollution. It first appeared in the Jintsu river basin 
in Toyama Prefecture before the prewar period. It was caused by heavy metal 
poisoning, in particular by cadmium flowing out from Mitsui Mining & Smelting 
mining sites in Kamioka. Survivors and patients filed suit for damages against 
Mitsui Mining & Smelting in 1968.(47) A fourth disease related to soot pollution 
emitted from chemical plants. In September 1967, residents of Yokkaichi, Mie 
Prefecture brought action against six companies as victims of severe asthma 
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attacks caused by pollutants from the chimneys of the neighborhood industrial 
complex.(48)
Pollution damage spread widely because the government and the industries 
themselves did not act quickly enough to stop the pollution. In the case of 
the first Minamata disease, Chisso was quick to deny any responsibility, even 
after they knew the truth.(49) In 1959, research revealed that the causative agent 
of Minamata disease derived from methyl mercury discharges. Nevertheless, 
it took a long time for the government to come to the aid of the victims, so 
influential was the interests of big business on government leadership at this 
time. Finally, in 1967, bowing to pressure from citizen protest movements, 
the government identified Chisso as the source of the pollution and issued the 
Environmental Pollution Prevention Act, the first of series of laws designed to 
limit industrial pollution and clean up Japan’s natural environment. The 1967 
law was later strengthened by the Environmental Basic Law passed in 1993. 
The laws encouraged legal action against company that were responsible for 
pollution and opened paths for victims to gain compensation for their health 
issues. Some companies took their responsible seriously and carried out anti-
pollution measures and the soil and water clean-up measures, but there were also 
companies that sought to destroy evidence of their polluting activities, leaving 
areas of doubt even today. 
These examples of environmental pollution caused by the Japanese 
chemical industry deserve an in-depth study.(50) Against this backdrop, there 
is one point that needs to be emphasized: The same company executives 
that were responsible for serious environmental pollution contributed to the 
development of science and technology in prewar Japan, and tried to find a 
means to solve the problem of hunger after the war. Nevertheless, tragically and 
ironically, their actions produced results that cost lives rather that saved them. 
The rush to increase the production of ammonium sulfate perhaps encouraged 
irresponsible cost-cutting; nonetheless, it is possible to see here the complexity 
of contemporary environmental issues in which the good and the bad, the ugly 
and the beautiful seemingly are destined to co-exist. The reality of science and 
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technology and environmental issues today is that they cannot be understood 
without placing them in social and historical context. 
VI. Conclusion 
This article has touched on the environmental damage caused by the 
Japanese chemical industry. These toxic results were the result of weak or even 
non-existent environmental protection laws and policies. Strict pollution laws 
and regulations are necessarily the first step to protect the environment. At the 
same time, we have seen that the Japanese chemical industry produced chemical 
fertilizers so necessary to enrich the fertility of the soil. Chemicals thus helped 
the Japanese overcome food shortage at the end of the Second World War.
Japan, in the 1950s, was highly focused on the goal of economic recovery. 
We can also see that priorities were placed on economic interest accepting risks 
to the health of the environment and the human body. The chemical Industry was 
highly commercialized and sought to expand indefinitely if possible. No or little 
thought was given to the need to prevent any adverse effects of such expansion. 
One conclusion to be drawn from this tragic but ironic story is the absolute 
necessity to publicly discuss issues of risk when new technology is introduced 
into society. Lacking then and even today, as can be seen after the meltdown of 
the Fukushima nuclear energy plants in 2011, is an inquisitive, investigative and 
pro-active media; a transparent and flexible decision-making system; adherence 
to and maintenance of law and regulation; and the clear communication of 
ethical values between experts and general populace. Environment problems 
have been part and parcel of the industrialization and modernization of Japan, 
as with societies everywhere. However, the sorts of environmental problems 
encountered in Japan and elsewhere today are qualitatively and quantitatively 
different from those of the early and mid-twentieth century; they are increasingly 
global in impact. It is necessary not only to think about profit and risk, but 
also think seriously about global risk management. The Minamata disease and 
the Great East Japan Earthquake are unresolved tragedies highlighted in this 
paper. These calamities provide historical lessons that need to be learned and 
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fully understood. They should not be seen as event of a certain era of the past. 
Rather, they should remind us to fully consider the risks and implications that 
advances in science and technology will continue to deliver to society. Only by 
facing these issues honestly and deal carefully with the interaction of risk and 
convenience, can we dream of creating an ideal society in which the good will 
be greater than the bad, the beautiful more powerful than the ugly.
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<Summary>
Akinori YAMABE
While the development of science and technology, has influenced the 
convenience and wellbeing of our society, there is a need to consider the social 
consequences and the effects of pollution into the environment. This article 
will focus on the damages and impacts of the environmental pollution caused 
by the Japanese chemical industry. This disaster was instigated by the lack of 
environmental protection laws and poor policies in Japan which could have 
enforced strict environmental pollution regulations. The disaster first started 
during the Japanese industrialization period back in the Meiji era. Later, it 
continued after the severe food shortages, caused by the effects of WWII. 
During this period the Japanese chemical industry provided a strong production 
of chemical fertilizers in order to restart the production crops and food for the 
whole country. Many serious environmental problems occurred between 1950s 
and the 1970s, in particular in postwar Japan and during the period of the revival 
of the Japanese chemical industry. This period serves as a historical example 
and clearly highlights the need for risk management and the need for further 
understanding of the repercussions that science and technology present the 
environment and the need for further study.
Foreshadowing Social Risk: 
The Dual Aspects of the Chemical Industry in
Early Twentieth Century Japan

